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Abstract
We investigate the eect of counseling and monitoring on the individual
transition rate to employment. We theoretically analyze these policies in a
job search model with two search channels and endogenous search eort.
In the empirical analysis we use unique administrative and survey data
concerning a social experiment with full randomization and compliance.
The results show that counseling and monitoring do not aect the exit rate
to work. Monitoring causes a shift from informal to formal job search. We
combine our empirical results to the results from our theoretical analysis
and the existing empirical literature, to establish a comprehensive analysis
of the eectiveness of these policies.
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There has recently been an increasing interest in stimulating re-employment of
unemployed workers by so-called \active labor market policies". In this paper
we evaluate the eects of two of such policies: counseling and monitoring. In
The Netherlands, counseling and monitoring (C&M) are provided by the local
unemployment insurance (UI) agencies1 to UI recipients with relatively good
labor market prospects. C&M consists of monthly meetings with an employee of
the local UI agency for a period of 6 months starting immediately after in
ow
into UI. During these meetings, recent job search activities are evaluated and a
planning on the next period's job search activities is made. The main purpose
of C&M is to reduce the duration of unemployment and consequently the total
amount paid on UI benets. These are therefore the outcome variables we focus
on.
For a theoretical investigation of the eect of C&M on the exit rate to work
we use a job search model with multiple search channels and endogenous search
eort. This model is used to guide the interpretation of the empirical results.
Many studies have demonstrated the importance of distinguishing between var-
ious search channels (see Blau and Robins, 1990, Foug ere, Pradel and Roger,
1998, Holzer, 1988, Keeley and Robins, 1985, Koning, Van den Berg and Ridder,
1997, and Montgomery, 1991). We allow for formal and informal job search. For-
mal search means using formalized search methods like personnel advertisements
and the public employment oce. Informal search occurs when for example un-
employed workers receive job oers through referral by an employed worker, a
friend or a relative. C&M only concerns formal job search, as it aims at increas-
ing the eciency of formal job search eort (or reducing the associated costs;
this is the counseling component) and at closer monitoring of formal job search.
Our theoretical model extends previously analyzed models, and our comparative
statics results on the eects of active labor market policies generalize previously
derived results. In addition, we establish a connection to the recent literature
on principal-agent models with multi-tasking (see e.g. Holmstr om and Milgrom,
1991, Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, and Prendergast, 1999). In our context, the
principal is the UI agency, the agents are the UI recipients, and the tasks are the
search eorts along the formal and informal channel, where the former is much
1Although the main task of the local UI agencies concerns payment of UI benets, the
provision of training, schooling, etc. is also among their tasks. The public employment oces
act as matching agents, not only to UI recipients, but also to welfare recipients and employed
workers searching for (new) jobs.
1easier to monitor than the latter.
Our data are from a heavily controlled social experiment, with full random-
ization. Moreover, in the experiment, cross-over between treatment and control
groups is impossible, at the moment of assignment or afterwards. The partic-
ipants in the experiment are not informed in advance about the fact that the
experiment is going on. None of the individuals in either group complained about
their status. All this simplies the econometric evaluation of average population
treatment eects. It is not necessary to apply advanced econometric techniques
to deal with sample selection bias from nonrandom participation and we do not
have to rely on instrumental variables or functional form assumptions to identify
the average treatment eect (see e.g. LaLonde, 1986).
Over the last years the use of randomized social experiments to evaluate ac-
tive labor market policies has become somewhat more common. This has been
particularly the case in the U.S. and Canada (see for example Ashenfelter, Ash-
more and Desch^ enes, 1999, Card and Robins, 1998, Eberwein, Ham and LaLonde,
1997, and Meyer, 1995). In Europe this approach is very uncommon (in their com-
prehensive survey, Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999, only list three European
studies). Moreover, in many cases, the conceptual advantage of social experiments
is reduced by practical problems of noncompliance.
The data and the experiment concern a sample of the in
ow into unemploy-
ment in late 1998. In addition to the administrative database, we also have access
to survey responses from the individuals. concerning aspects of their job search
behavior and (activities by) the local UI agency. We match the two databases
and we perform parametric and nonparametric analyses. The survey data provide
insights into behavioral changes that could not have been obtained from admin-
istrative data only. In fact, these turn out to be pivotal in understanding social
welfare eects of the policy.
The literature contains some studies on the eects of job search assistance
and monitoring of unemployed workers, using data from randomized social ex-
periments (see Ashenfelter, Ashmore and Desch^ enes, 1999, Gorter and Kalb,
1996, White and Lakey, 1992, Dolton and O'Neill, 1995, 1996, and the surveys
in Bj orklund and Regn er, 1996, Fay, 1996, and Heckman, LaLonde and Smith,
1999). Together, these studies cover a range of programs, and the composition of
the in
ow as well as the macro-economic circumstances dier between them. We
combine the empirical evidence from our administrative data and the survey data
with the theoretical insights that we obtained and the results in this empirical
literature, in order to enhance our understanding of the economic behavior of the
unemployed individuals. This enables us to extrapolate our empirical results and
2to draw conclusions about a wider class of labor market policies that concern
job search assistance and monitoring of search eort. As such, the present paper
demonstrates that the return of a social experiment is not necessarily restricted
to a single estimate of the average treatment eect (notwithstanding the gen-
eral diculties with comparisons between experiments concerning programs with
self-selection; see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999).
The outline of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give a detailed de-
scription of the Dutch UI system and we discuss the C&M treatment. Section 3
deals with the theoretical job search model that we use to interpret the results.
In Sections 4 and 5 we discuss the setup of the experiment, the unique adminis-
trative database used to estimate the model and the follow-up survey. In Section
6 we present the estimation results and we perform some sensitivity analyses. We
also discuss diculties that may arise when one uses binary outcome methods
to analyze duration data with treatments. In Section 7 we establish a compre-
hensive analysis of the eectiveness of the policies under consideration. Section 8
concludes the paper.
2 Counseling and monitoring
2.1 Unemployment insurance
In this section we describe the Dutch UI system in the late nineties. The aim
of the Unemployment Law in The Netherlands is to insure employees against
the nancial consequences of unemployment. Excluded from this law are self-
employed and civil servants, who have an alternative arrangement. It insures
around 70% of all workers. Here, we explain its essence, and we highlight aspects
that are relevant for our purpose. Given that the observation window of our
database covers less than 6 months after in
ow, we mostly restrict attention to
features that are important for that period.
If a worker younger than 65 years loses his job, he is entitled to UI benets,
provided that some conditions are fullled. The worker has to face a reduction
in his original working hours of at least 5 hours per week, or half of his original
working hours if less than 10 hours per week, he should not get paid for this
working hour reduction and he should be willing to accept a new job. Further-
more, the individual should have had a job for at least 26 weeks in the past 39
weeks prior to the start of the unemployment period. The level of the benets is
fully determined by the history of labor force attachment. The income levels of
other household members and private assets do not matter for UI. There are two
3possible schemes of UI benets: (i) wage-related benets, and (ii) short-period
benets.
To be entitled to wage-related benets, the unemployed worker must have
worked at least 52 days during each of 4 years out of the past 5 calendar years.
The wage-related benets start with a period of initial benets. The level of the
initial benets equals 70% of the wage in the job previous to unemployment with
a maximum of 305.96 guilders per day (two Dutch guilders roughly equal one
U.S. dollar).2 The exact duration of the entitlement period lies between 6 months
and 5 years and depends on the employment history of the unemployed worker.
For an entitlement period of 1 year, the unemployed worker must have had jobs
for at least 10 years. For an entitlement period of 5 years, 40 years of working is
required. After the entitlement to initial benets expires, the unemployed worker
receives extended benets for a period of 2 years if his age was under 57.5 years
at the rst day of unemployment and 3.5 years otherwise. The extended benets
level is equal to 70% of the minimum wage or 70% of the wage in the last job
before unemployment, whichever is lower.
Individuals who do not meet the requirement for collecting wage-related ben-
ets, receive \short-period" benets. The duration of receiving short-period ben-
ets is always 6 months. The level of short-period benets is similar to extended
benets, 70% of the minimum wage or 70% of the wage in the last job, whichever
was lower.
If during the UI entitlement period the household income of a UI recipient
decreases below \welfare level", the UI recipient may receive supplementary ben-
ets to make up for the dierence.3 This applies to both unemployed workers
receiving wage-related benets and short-period benets. If, after the expiration
of (either type of) UI benets, the individual has not found a job, he may receive
welfare benets. These are means (household income) tested and related to what
is considered to be the social minimum income.
According to the Unemployment Law, an unemployed worker has the following
obligations in order to be entitled to UI benets: (i) prevent unnecessary job loss,
(ii) take actions to prevent him from staying unemployed, so he has to search for
a job and accept appropriate job oers, register as a job searcher at the public
employment oce, participate in education and training, etc., and (iii) keep the
local UI agency informed about everything that is relevant to the payment of
the UI benets. If an unemployed worker does not comply to these rules, the
2Actually, less than 5% of the in
ow in our data set receives the maximum benets.
3At the end of 1997 only 7.2% of the stock of UI recipients collected supplementary benets
(LISV, 1998).
4local UI agency is authorized (not obliged) to apply a sanction to that worker.
See Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours (1997) for a study on the eects of
imposing sanctions on the exit rate to work. The administration of the UI system
is organized at the level of the industry. There are 4 nation-wide UI agencies that
each represent a number of sectors of the economy. In The Netherlands, at the
end of 1997, 335.000 individuals collected UI benets.4
At the intake meeting of UI, an individual is classied (\proled") into one of
four \types", based on individual characteristics such as work experience, age and
education, and on some subjective measures such as expected job search behavior,

exibility, language skills and presentation skills. See Appendix 1 for a detailed
description of the process of proling. The Type I individuals are expected to have
sucient skills to nd a job. The Type II and III individuals are considered not
to have the skills to nd work without assistance such as training and schooling.
The Type IV individuals are the most disadvantaged and need more care. They
are often unable to work or not obliged to search for work (lone parents with
dependent children, drug addicts, etc.). In the in
ow of unemployed workers into
UI, 75% to 80% is classied as Type I, whereas in the stock of UI recipients,
about 60% is classied as Type I. Newly unemployed who do not qualify for UI
are also assigned to one of these four types, but among them the Type I fraction
is lower.
All UI recipients have to send in weekly reports concerning job search activi-
ties. This can be done by mail. Once every four weeks, the UI agency determines
whether the individual is still eligible for UI benets.
2.2 The treatment
Since April 1998 all local UI agencies are obliged to support Type I unemployed
workers by providing C&M. Before that, C&M was provided by a fraction of agen-
cies. During this pre-1998 period C&M has been reformed a number of times, and
the target population has changed along as well. For example, in the beginning
almost all UI recipients were eligible for C&M, but in periods in which the number
of unemployed workers applying for UI benets was high, only a limited number
of them received C&M. In its current form C&M is standardized, and all UI re-
cipients eligible for C&M actually receive it. Excluded are individuals who know
at the date of UI registration that they will start a new job within 3 weeks and
4The Netherlands has 16 million inhabitants, of which 10.5 million are aged between 15
and 65. The 1997 labor force consists of 6.8 million individuals, of which 438.000 do not work.
The 1997 yearly in- and out
ow into and out of UI equal 486.000 and 531.700 individuals,
respectively.
5Type I unemployed workers collecting short-period benets. C&M is a process of
half a year. During this period the unemployed workers have a meeting at the
local UI agency every 4 weeks.
The intake meeting of the C&M takes place within three days after the start
of the payment of the UI benets. It takes about 45 minutes. The quality of
application letters and the curriculum vitae are examined, the dierent channels
through which work can be found are discussed and a planning is made about
what the individual should do until the next meeting. Although the local UI
agency can inform the unemployed worker about possible job entries, it is not al-
lowed to act as an intermediate between unemployed workers and rms. Oering
or pointing out specic vacancies to unemployed workers is the task of the pub-
lic employment oces. Another important element of C&M is to stimulate the
unemployed worker to frequently contact the public employment oces. During
this intake meeting it is stressed that a positive and active attitude toward job
search is expected.
The follow up meetings take around 20 minutes and focus on applications to
specic job vacancies and employers. During this meeting the planning of the
previous meeting is evaluated and a planning for the next period is made. If the
unemployed worker did not comply to the planning, he may be punished with
a sanction in the form of a reduction of the UI benets. The average sanction
for insucient job search is a 10% reduction of the UI benets for a period of
2 months. However, both the magnitude and the duration of a benet reduction
may vary depending on the precise reason for why the sanction has been imposed
(see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours, 1997). Note that the C&M require-
ments come on top of the reports on search activities that have to be sent in
every week.
Provision of C&M is cheap. The Dutch National Institute for Social Secu-
rity pays the local UI agencies on average 335.98 guilders for providing C&M.
This is paid at the beginning of UI entitlement period and does not depend on
the realized unemployment duration. Each C&M meeting includes a check on
whether the unemployed worker is still eligible for UI benets. Performing this
check would otherwise cost on average 38.61 guilders. So the Dutch National
Institute for Social Security saves 38.61 guilders for each additional month that
an individual collects UI benets. For a number of reasons, the amounts may
vary between individuals and local UI agencies. The gures mentioned above are
average realized amounts.
63 Theoretical analysis
3.1 Job search with endogenous search eort and multiple
search channels
In this section we analyze the eects of C&M in a theoretical model of job search
and unemployment duration. We start with a presentation of the basic model.
In Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 we focus on the eects of counseling and monitoring,
respectively. The model is based on the standard job search model with an en-
dogenous search intensity (see e.g. Mortensen, 1986). We generalize the model
by allowing job oers to arrive through formal as well as informal search chan-
nels, each with its own associated structural parameters and endogenous search
intensity. Such a model has not been analyzed before in the literature.
Consider an unemployed worker searching for a job. This individual can search
along the formal and the informal channel, which are denoted by subscripts 1
and 2, respectively. An amount of search eort si  0 is devoted to search along
channel i. This variable si, which is also called the search intensity for channel
i, is to be chosen optimally by the unemployed worker. Job oers along search
channel i arrive at the individual according to a Poisson process with rate isi.
A job oer along channel i is characterized by a random drawing from a
channel-specic wage oer distribution Fi. Arrival times and wage oers are in-
dependent across channels, and given the channel they are independent across
time. For ease of exposition, we assume that F1 and F2 are continuous with a
connected support stretching to innity, on which the densities are positive. If
a job oer arrives, the individual has to decide immediately whether to accept
it or to reject it and continue searching. We do not allow for the possibility to
reconsider job oers at a later stage. Furthermore, for ease of exposition, we as-
sume that once a job is accepted, it will be kept forever, at the same wage. We
thus exclude on-the-job-search and job loss. However, our results are robust with
respect to this.
The costs of search are expressed by the function c(s1;s2). We require c to be
increasing and convex in its arguments, with c(0;0) = 0. Moreover, we require
@2c=(@s1@s2) > 0 for s1;s2 > 0, to capture that the eorts along the two channels
are relatively similar activities compared to most other ways to spend time and
money, and to capture that a certain fraction of vacancies may be found along
either channel. For these reasons, a specication for c that is additive in s1 and s2
seems less plausible. In the literature on search models with endogenous search
eort s and a single search channel, the arrival rate and the search costs are
7generally taken to be proportional to s and s2, respectively (see the survey by
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). We require that our specication for c reduces
to such a quadratic specication in case only one channel is used, or in case both
channels are equivalent. So, our function c has to be such that c(s;0);c(0;s) and
c(s;s) are quadratic in s. Finally, we require c to lead to interior solutions for the
optimal s1 and s2, because most individuals in the data report the use of both
channels to search.










It is readily veried that this satises the above requirements if ai > 0 and 1 <

 < 2. It should be emphasized that most of our results carry over to alternative
specications for c that satisfy some or all of the above requirements, for example
a specication where c is proportional to (s1 + s2)2, possibly with an additional
xed costless amount of eort,5 or a specication where c is proportional to
(s2
1 + s2
2)2. One additional reason for adopting (1) is that it leads to relatively
transparent expressions.
For expositional convenience, we present results for the case where 
 = 3=2.
Also, we normalize a1 and a2. As will become clear below, these are unidentied



















with the parameter c0 satisfying 0 < c0 < 1.
During unemployment, benets b are received. Individuals maximize their ex-
pected discounted income over an innite time horizon. The expected discounted
income (or \value of search") and the discount rate are denoted by R and ,
respectively.
We make the following assumptions on the structural determinants. First,
0 < 1;2;E1(w);E2(w);c0;b; < 1
where Ei(w) denotes the expected wage associated with job oer through search
channel i. Also note that we do not require that b  c(s1;s2). Secondly, all struc-
tural determinants are assumed to be constant over time. This assumption is made
5Foug ere, Pradel and Roger (1998) and Sabatier (2001) eectively specify the arrival rate
and the search costs as s and c0(s   s)2, respectively, where s and (s   s) are interpreted
as the arrival rates along the formal and informal channel, respectively (or as the arrival rates
of oers generated by the agency and oers generated by the worker).
8for expositional convenience. We know from Subsection 2.1 that this assumption
is incorrect for b. After expiration of the entitlement to \initial benets", b drops
to the level of the \extended benets", and at a later stage it may drop to the
welfare level. However, the expected unemployment duration of an unemployed
worker who is eligible for C&M is typically much shorter than the duration of
entitlement to initial UI benets. Van den Berg (1990) shows that if the exit rate
to work is high and the moment at which b decreases is not very close, then the
anticipation of the future decrease of b is very low, so, by approximation, the
individual behaves as if b is constant.



























(see Mortensen, 1986, and Albrecht, Holmlund and Lang, 1991), where the op-
timal search intensities are given by the values of s1 and s2 that maximize the
right-hand side, and where the optimal job acceptance strategy is to accept if
and only if the wage w exceeds R. This denes the unique reservation wage
 as  = R. The optimal strategy of an unemployed worker can therefore be
summarized by  and the optimal search eorts s1 and s2. To proceed, it is useful
to dene








= Ei(w   xjw > x)

























The optimal search eorts given  follow from maximization of the right-hand














9Because all components on the right-hand side are positive and nite for i =
1;2, the individual devotes a positive and nite amount of eort to each search
channel. Note that the equation states that marginal search costs equal marginal
benets of search along channel i. By dividing both sides of (5) for i = 1 by
both sides for i = 2, it follows that
q
s1=s2 = 1Q1()=(2Q2()). This can be

















If we substitute these into (4), we obtain an implicit expression for the optimal
reservation wage in terms of the model determinants,
















By substituting the solution of this into (6), we obtain an expression for si in terms
of the structural determinants. This completes a recursive system of equations for
the optimal strategy. Note from the above expression for  that 0 < b <  < 1.
The rate i at which individuals nd a job through a given search channel i
equals the product of the rate at which job oers arrive through this channel and
the acceptance probability of such job oers, so i = isiF i(). The transition
rate from unemployment to employment  equals the sum of these rates over both











Note that due to the stationarity, this transition rate does not depend on elapsed
unemployment duration or any other measure of time. In the remainder of this
section we investigate how C&M might aect it.
The optimal reservation wage and the channel-specic and total transition
rates from unemployment to employment depend on i and c0 solely by way of
2
i=c0. This implies that with data on reservation wages, unemployment durations,
and post-unemployment wages, it is in general not possible to identify 1;2 and
c0. Moreover, the comparative statics eects of an increase in the eciency i of
a search channel, on , i and , are qualitatively equivalent to the comparative
statics eects of a decrease in the unit search cost.
103.2 The theoretical eect of counseling
We assume that counseling is intended to facilitate search along the formal chan-
nel. There are a number of reasons why the eciency of search along the formal
channel may increase as a result of counseling. For example, the case worker at
the local UI agency may help to improve the application letters and the curricu-
lum vitae, employers provide information to the case worker about vacancies to
which the unemployed worker can apply, the case worker makes appointments for
the unemployed worker at the public employment oce, etc. In general, search
along the formal channel can be facilitated by way of an increase of 1 or a de-
crease of c0. We are interested in the eect of this on . For ease of exposition,
and without loss of generality, we focus on the eect of 1 on  assuming that c0
is constant.
There is a substantial theoretical literature on the comparative statics eect
of a job oer arrival rate on the exit rate out of unemployment. This literature
assumes constant search intensities and is concerned with a single search channel.
In that case, the job oer arrival rate has two opposite eects on the exit rate out
of unemployment (and hence on the expected duration of unemployment). First,
there is a positive eect on the exit rate because of the increased rate at which
oers arrive. Secondly, there is a negative eect because of the increased selectivity
of the searcher in face of this increased opportunity to leave unemployment (the
reservation wage increases, and as a result the acceptance probability decreases).
The sign and magnitude of the net eect depend on other variables aecting the
optimal strategy of an unemployed individual (like the wage oer distribution
and the subjective rate of discount) and therefore the sign of the net eect is
ambiguous. The most general comparative statics results are in Van den Berg
(1994), who shows that the eect is positive under very weak restrictions on the
shape of the wage oer distribution. In this subsection, we extend these results
to a setting with endogenous search intensities and multiple search channels.
In the model with endogenous search intensities and a single search channel,
the parameter  also aects the optimal search intensity. This may give an ad-
ditional boost to the actual rate at which oers arrive. At rst sight this may
suggest that in such a model the eect of  on  is positive under weaker condi-
tions than in the model with xed search eort. However, the fact that the search
intensity increases also implies that the worker can be even more selective with
respect to the oers that arrive. In case of two search channels, the parameter 1
aects both search intensities and both channel-specic acceptance probabilities,
thus complicating matters even further.
In the remainder we assume that the optimal  lies within the support of both
11wage oer distributions Fi(), so that 0 < F i() < 1, thereby excluding trivial
comparative statics cases.





for all w in the support of F. This is of course the hazard rate associated with
the distribution F. For small dw the expression  (w)dw can be interpreted as the
probability that a wage oer is in the interval [w;w + dw) if it is given that this
wage oer exceeds w. In order to avoid confusion with the hazard rate associated
with the unemployment duration distribution, we will call   the failure rate of F.
Concerning the shape of  , all the insights from the literature on hazard rates of
duration distributions carries through. For example, if F has a fat right tail then
 (w) decreases for large w. See Van den Berg (1994) for a detailed discussion.
Now consider the following restriction on a wage oer distribution F,
Condition A The expression w  (w) is non-decreasing in w, for every w in the
support of F.
Van den Berg (1994) shows that this is a weak restriction on probability distribu-
tions for non-negative random variables, in particular for random variables that
are related to income variables. For example, it is satised by all distributions in
the exponential, beta, Weibull, gamma, log-normal, Pareto, Generalized Beta-2,
Singh-Maddala, F, and log-uniform families, the families of logistic, normal, t,
and extreme value distributions that are truncated from below at or above zero,
and the family of uniform distributions for which the lower point of support is
non-negative. As a result, all families of distributions generally used to model
wage oer distributions in job search models and other income-related distribu-
tions satisfy Condition A.6 We now proceed to present results for our model.
Proposition 1 If F1 = F2 and if F1 satises Condition A, then d=d1 > 0. In
addition, d=d1 > 0;ds1=d1 > 0;ds2=d1 < 0;d1=d1 > 0 and d2=d1 < 0.
Proof. See Appendix 2. We should note that F1 = F2 and Condition A are by no
means necessary to obtain d=d1 > 0.
6Van den Berg (1994) shows that the eect of the job oer arrival rate on the exit rate out
of unemployment is positive in his model if the wage oer distribution satises Condition A.
12If formal job search eort becomes more ecient, the optimal reservation wage
increases. A higher value of 1 improves the present value of the unemployed
worker and therefore he becomes more selective concerning the wages oered. If
formal job search becomes more ecient, individuals also substitute informal job
search eort into formal job search eort. It turns out that, under the conditions
of Proposition 1, the rate at which the individual leaves unemployment by way
of the formal (informal) channel increases (decreases), and that the rst eect
dominates in the total exit rate out of unemployment.
One may wonder whether F1 = F2 is a reasonable assumption. We examine
this from an empirical and a theoretical perspective. First, let us examine the
empirical evidence. Koning, Van den Berg and Ridder (1997) use labor force
survey data from The Netherlands to test whether the wage oer distributions
are dierent between the formal and informal search channel. They do not reject
the null hypothesis of equality. Lindeboom, Van Ours and Renes (1994) nd
that, in the Netherlands, informal wage oers have a relatively large acceptance
probability, which suggests that the left tail of F2 is thinner than of F1, or that
wages found along the informal channel are on average higher than those found
along the formal channel. This dierence in acceptance probability is also found
for the U.S. by Holzer (1988).
The theoretical literature suggests that there may be reasons to suspect that
F2 rst-order stochastically dominates F1, that is, wages found along the infor-
mal channel are on average higher than those found along the formal channel.
Mortensen and Vishwanath (1994) develop an equilibrium search model with a
formal and an informal search channel and xed search intensities. In this model,
employed workers also search on the job for jobs with higher wages, so that in
equilibrium rms paying high wages also have a relatively large workforce. If a
worker nds a job by way of referral by currently employed workers, then the
probability of getting an oer of a particular rm is proportional to the size of
that rm. If a worker nds a job by way of formal applications to vacancies then
the sampling of rms is uniform. Hence, informal search generates on average
higher wage oers in equilibrium.
Now let us examine to what extent the results in Proposition 1 are actually
sensitive to the assumption that F1 = F2. If F1 and F2 are dierent then it is more
dicult to provide elegant conditions under which d=d1 is positive. Intuitively it
is clear that if F2 has a very large amount of probability mass around to  whereas
F1 does not, so that the corresponding densities at  satisfy f2() >> f1(), then
the eect may be negative. In such a case, the increase in 1 increases the present
value and therefore the reservation wage , but as a result a large number of
13informal job oers become unacceptable, and the exit rate out of unemployment
may decrease. Simulations suggest that this scenario is particularly likely if most
probability mass of F1 is below . But such a scenario is not in agreement to the
empirical and theoretical evidence, which suggest that F1 = F2 or F2 dominates
F1. We therefore conclude that any dierences in practice between F1 and F2 are
not expected to result in a negative sign of d=d1.
The results of this subsection are robust with respect to the functional form
of the search cost function and the way eort is modeled. In particular, they also
follow in case of other cost functions with a positive cross-derivative with respect
to s1;s2, possibly with an additional xed costless amount of eort, and even
in case of cost functions that are additive in terms that depend on s1 and s2,
respectively.
3.3 The theoretical eect of monitoring
We assume that the monitoring in C&M concerns the formal job search eort s1
but not the informal search eort. The local UI agency can check the number of
times the UI recipient responds on a job advertisement, the number of application
letters written, subscription at public employment oces, etc. It is for the local UI
agency much more dicult to measure how often an individual asks friends and
relatives about job openings. When providing C&M the monitoring eort of the
local UI agency therefore focuses on search along the formal channel. Specically,
the agency imposes a minimum search eort (or threshold value) devoted to
formal job search denoted by s
1.
Full compliance can be achieved by perfect monitoring of formal job search
eort or by a suciently severe punishment of noncompliance. In practice, the
most common punishment in case of noncompliance is a sanction, which is a
temporary benet reduction (see Abbring, Van den Berg and Van Ours, 1997).
In the subsequent sections of this paper we show that monitoring is actually
regarded to be quite intensive, and that sanctions are virtually absent among
the individuals who receive C&M. We therefore simply assume that there is no
noncompliance.
It is clear that if the optimal formal job search eort s1 in the unrestricted case
lies above this threshold value, then the individual will not change his behavior,
so monitoring does not have any eect. We focus on the more interesting case in
which the required eort is higher than the eort in the absence of monitoring.
In this case, the optimal strategy can be summarized merely by  and s2. To see
what can happen when monitoring is introduced, it is instructive to examine a


















replaces equation (3), with again  = R. It follows that the optimum search
intensities satisfy




but the optimum values of the separate search intensities si are undetermined.
Any combination of s1  0 and s2  0 such that s1 + s2 satises (11) is optimal.
Suppose that the individual levels of s1 and s2 are determined outside the
model, and suppose that the agency imposes s
1, with s
1 exceeding the level of s1
in the unrestricted case but falling short of the level of s1+s2 in the unrestricted
case. Then search eort along the formal channel increases to s
1, but this is fully
compensated by a decrease in the optimal eort s2 along the informal channel,
such that s1 + s2 remains constant. This results in the same value of s1 + s2
as in the unrestricted case. As a result, nothing happens to  and . Increased
monitoring is ineective due to eort substitution. Keeley and Robins (1985)
also mention substitution of search eort in response to monitoring of the formal
search channel. However, they do not provide a formal theoretical analysis.
Now let us return to the more general model specication that we used
throughout this section. The optimal reservation wage  follows from equation
(4), where the right-hand side is now maximized over s2 while s1 is xed at s
1.
Note that the marginal returns to formal job search eort are now lower than
the marginal costs. The optimal reservation wage is decreasing in the binding
minimum required formal search eort level. Unemployed workers are forced to
behave sub-optimally, so being unemployed becomes less attractive, and therefore
they are willing to accept jobs with lower wages. For essentially the same reason,
unemployed workers would not participate voluntarily in a monitoring scheme
with a binding minimum search eort.7 Of course, the advantages of monitoring
7They may participate voluntarily in a counseling scheme that increases 1, because this
increases the expected present value of being unemployed. A combination of the two schemes
may be attractive to the unemployed workers, depending on the parameter values.
15are outside of the individual's decision problem. The agency may want to reduce
the total payment of UI (i.e., to increase  by way of monitoring) because it
believes that the advantages of this outweigh the reduction of the unemployed
worker's present value.
The optimal s2 given  satises equation (5) for i = 2, with again s1 xed
at s
1. From this equation it can be seen that an increase in s
1 has two eects
on s2. First, the marginal costs of using the informal channel increase, at any
level of s2. This has a negative eect on the optimal s2. Secondly, the marginal
returns of using the informal channel increase, because unemployment becomes
less attractive ( decreases, so Q2() increases). This has a positive eect on
the optimal s2. These two eects could be labeled the substitution and income
eect, respectively. It seems dicult to derive simple conditions under which the
substitution eect always dominates (i.e., ds2=ds
1 < 0), but it is very easy to
construct wide ranges of examples where this holds, and indeed this seems to be
the regular case. If the individual is forced to increase his eort along the formal
channel then the marginal costs of using the informal channel increase, and he
will reduce his eort along the informal channel.
Concerning the over-all eect of s
1 on , again it seems dicult to derive
simple conditions under which this is always positive or negative. However, it is
not dicult to construct numerical examples where the eect is actually negative
(especially when 1 < 2). In those cases, the eect of the imposed increase
in eort along the formal channel is more than oset by the implied decrease
in eort along the informal channel. Monitoring then has the perverse eect of
reducing the transition rate to employment.8 In the literature, this eect has not
been discussed before. Note that it implies that in this case monitoring is an
ineective policy.
In some specic cases, monitoring may increase . Notably, if s2 is already very
small then there is not much scope for substitution in response to imposition of
s
1, as s2 is bounded from below by zero. Also, if 2 is very small (which may
in turn cause s2 to be small) then the reduction of s2 may have a smaller eect
on  than the increase of s1. In the limiting case of 2 = 0, we are in a model
with a single channel, and a binding s
1 always increases  (Abbring, Van den
Berg and Van Ours, 1997). The empirical literature is informative on the use
8Again, these results can be generalized to model specications with other cost functions.
However, in the unrealistic case where total search costs are additive in the search costs per
channel, it can be shown that the imposition of a binding minimum required search eort along
the formal channel has a positive eect on . In that case, the imposition of s
1 entails an income
eect on s2 but not a substitution eect.
16of dierent search channels by dierent types of workers. There is overwhelming
evidence that workers with characteristics such that their chances to nd a job are
low, long-term unemployed workers, workers in a labor market with unfavorable
circumstances, and workers in recessions, all rely to a relatively large extent on
formal search (see the references earlier in this section and references therein).
These individuals do not have access to informal search channels, or their informal
search channel has dried up. For such individuals, monitoring may have a positive
eect on .
As we have seen, monitoring forces individuals to behave sub-optimally. Sup-
pose for convenience that F1 = F2. If 1 < 2 then the sub-optimal behavior
entails the use of the inecient search channel at the expense of the ecient
channel. Even if the over-all eect on  is positive, it seems hard to imagine that
external advantages of monitoring would warrant such a policy.
Some of our results on monitoring bear an analogy to results in the principal-
agent models with multi-tasking (for overviews of the theoretical results and
empirical evidence, see Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, Prendergast, 1999, and De-
watripont, Jewitt and Tirole, 2000). Holmstr om and Milgrom (1991) study a
setting where workers perform multiple tasks and eorts are substitutes in the
agent's cost function. In case the employers are only capable of monitoring a sin-
gle task, contracts based on performance of this single task are inecient and give
rise to dysfunctional behavioral responses. This induces the use of low-powered
incentives. In our context, this may mean that the UI agency should pay UI ben-
ets without requiring minimum search eort requirements, even when the UI
agency has information on search eort along the formal channel.
4 The experiment
4.1 Design and implementation
The scale of the social experiment is modest. The experiment concerns all Type
I unemployed workers, who started collecting UI benets between August 24 and
December 2, 1998 at two local branches of one particular nation-wide UI agency.
The experiment ended on February 8, 1999. Only individuals who already know
at the beginning of their UI entitlement period that they will start a new job
within 3 weeks are excluded from the experiment, as they are not entitled to
C&M. The local agencies are in two of the largest cities of The Netherlands. In
the remainder we simply refer to these cities as City 1 and City 2. The in
ow
into UI at these local agencies is relatively large, and the agencies have a good
17reputation for carrying out C&M activities in a highly orderly fashion. Both
facts have played a role in the selection of these local agencies as venues for the
experiment.
In the initial setup of the experiment individuals were supposed to be ran-
domly assigned to 5 groups. The rst group would be the control group and the
individuals in the other groups would all receive C&M. After the experiment
ended one of the 4 \treatment" groups would be chosen randomly to construct
the nal database together with the control group. This nal database would
thus approximately count the same number of individuals who received C&M as
individuals who did not receive it. The main purpose of this setup was to avoid
that the local UI agencies would give special attention to the individuals in the
treatment group, which would bias the results of the experiment. As mentioned in
Subsection 2.2 the local UI agencies get paid for providing C&M and are therefore
eager to get a positive evaluation of C&M. However, because the in
ow of Type
I unemployed workers into UI was too small, the initial setup was not followed.
In practice, about 50% of the in
ow was assigned to the treatment group and the
control group. All individuals were included in the nal database.
During the UI intake meeting, the employee of the local UI agency establishes
if the UI recipients is eligible for receiving C&M. An independent agency then
decides based on a series of random numbers, which were realized in SPSS be-
fore the start of the experiment, whether this unemployed worker is selected in
the treatment group or the control group. At this stage the independent agency
only knows the unique ID-number of the individual. Individuals selected in the
treatment group have to show up at an intake meeting of C&M within 3 days.
The unemployed workers in the control group only communicate with the local
UI agency by way of sending in written forms stating the current status of their
job search activities.
At the local UI agency in City 2, the experiment was not performed exactly as
prescribed. At the rst intake meeting not all the eligibility criteria for receiving
C&M were checked. In particular, some Type II unemployed workers entered the
experiment. The Type II unemployed workers who were selected into the treat-
ment group were identied as being a Type II unemployed worker at the intake
meeting of C&M and were excluded from the experiment. However, if such an
individual was selected into the control group, it was not noted that the UI re-
cipient should not have participated in the experiment. We therefore rechecked
the individuals in the control group in City 2 on the criteria for being Type I.
This resulted in exclusion of a part of the control group from the data. However,
it cannot be completely ruled out that there are still a few Type II unemployed
18workers left in the control group. Because on average Type II unemployed work-
ers have worse labor market skills and therefore have longer expected spells of
unemployment (see Subsection 2.1), the estimated eect of C&M on the exit rate
to work might be slightly upwards biased.
4.2 Issues concerning the treatment evaluation
In some of our empirical analyses, we condition on individual characteristics.
Also, in some of our analyses, we allow the treatment eect to be heterogeneous
(see Section 6 below for more details). See Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999)
for a survey of dierent summary measures of treatment eects. Note that we
aim to compare two policy systems. In particular, we aim to estimate the average
eect across the population of UI entrants. In general (i.e., outside of the exper-
iment), exactly one of the two policy systems applies, in which case it applies to
all members of the target population. \Program participation" is then compul-
sory. In our experiment, assignment is compulsory, so there is no noncompliance
with the actual assignment. We therefore do not face the diculties of inferring
actual treatment eects from social experiments if actual participation (outside
the experiment) is subject to (self-)selection or if noncompliance is possible in
the experiment (see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999). We now address this
in more detail by focusing on aspects that potentially complicate the use of social
experiments to infer treatment eects.
First, the target population for C&M is dened as a subset of the in
ow into
UI, and individuals may let the decision to apply for UI depend on whether C&M
is provided. In the experiment, before the randomization occurs, all individuals
may expect to be treated. But the composition of the in
ow may dier between a
world without C&M and a world with C&M. However, recall that the individuals
in the target population have a relatively high UI benets level, and compared to
that, the (dis)utility of C&M seems very small. It is therefore unlikely that the
take-up rate depends on C&M.
Secondly, individuals in the in
ow into UI may subsequently try to select
themselves into or out of the Type I category, depending on whether C&M is
present. But if an individual who would be assigned to Type I (i.e. to the target
population) dislikes C&M, then he probably dislikes the treatments for the other
Types even more, as those are more intensive. Non-Type I individuals are unlikely
to be able to in
uence their classication, but it is possible that case workers
classify Type II individuals more easily as Type I if they feel that C&M helps
them more than the treatments intended for Type II individuals. In that case the
19population of Type I individuals in the world without C&M has higher exit rates
to work than the control group in the experiment, and we may over-estimate the
positive eect of C&M on the individual exit rate.
Thirdly, individuals in the treatment group may withdraw from treatment.
This could be done by demanding the same status as individuals in the control
group, or simply by not showing up at the monthly C&M meetings. The rst
type of withdrawal can only occur if the individual is aware of the experiment
and his assigned status. Individuals were not informed about the fact that they
participated in an experiment, and therefore neither about their status. Moreover,
both types of withdrawal result in imposition of a punitive sanction. As shown
in Section 5.1 below, the sanction rates among individuals in the treatment and
control groups are very small and have the same order of magnitude. This means
that withdrawal from the treatment group is absent or virtually absent.
. Fourthly, individuals in the control group may demand treatment. However,
this did not occur in the present experiment, and in fact none of the individuals
in the control group complained about not receiving C&M. Of course, individuals
in the control group may look for substitute job search assistance treatment from
other sources, but this would also occur in a world without C&M.
Fifthly, the local agencies involved in the experiment have a reputation for
carrying out C&M activities in a highly orderly fashion. This may mean that
C&M at other agencies is less intense. For this reason we might over-estimate the
nation-wide eect of C&M.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that various indirect and equilibrium eects
may bias the estimation of the over-all policy eect from a social experiment. In
our case, individuals in the control group may suer more than in a world without
C&M, and we over-estimate the positive eect of C&M on the exit rate to work.
We conclude this section by noting that if the eect estimate is biased, then it is
likely to over-estimate the positive eect on the exit rate to work.
5 The data
5.1 Data description
The database contains administrative information on 394 individuals who partic-
ipated in the experiment, i.e. who started to collect UI benets between August
24 and December 2, 1998 in City 1 and 2. All information on events is daily,
20i.e. we observe the exact day of in
ow into and out
ow out of UI.9 The latter is
only observed if it occurs before the moment at which the experiment ends and
the database is constructed (February 8, 1999). All spells which are not nished
by this date (42%) are right-censored. For the uncensored spells we observe the
exit destination, which is employment in 87.5% of the cases. The most frequently
observed other exit destination is illness (8.9%); other possibilities are: leaving
the city, prison, or not accepting suitable work. There is no systematic dierence
in how often these other exits occur in the treatment (receiving C&M) and the
control (not receiving C&M) group. Because we have administrative data, the
empirical analyses do not suer from selective nonresponse or attrition from the
database. However, we do not observe multiple unemployment spells per indi-
vidual. There is no information about events or income levels after exit out of
unemployment.
The in
ow into UI is larger in City 2 than in City 1. The database includes
249 individuals living in City 2 and 155 individuals living in City 1. To get an
indication of the local labor market conditions, we brie
y discuss some socioe-
conomic characteristics of both cities. These are collected in 1997. In both cities
slightly more than 60% of the population participates in the labor force and of
the labor force around 10% is registered as being unemployed. The main dier-
ence between these cities is the percentage of immigrants. In City 1, 20% of the
population consists of immigrants or children of immigrants, while this is more
than 40% in City 2. More individuals were selected into the treatment group than
in the control group, 205 individuals received C&M and 189 were excluded from
C&M.
In the empirical analyses we use the values of the explanatory variables x at
the moment of in
ow. Because the administrative database only contains vari-
ables that are needed by the UI agency, the number of variables in the database
is limited. For example we do not have any information on profession and the
level of education. Except for the city of residence and receiving C&M or not,
we observe the standard personal characteristics, gender, age and household sit-
uation (being single or living together with a partner). In addition, we observe
if the individual has ever received UI benets before. Furthermore, we know the
benets level per day and the number of days per week the unemployed worker
9As mentioned in Subsection 2.1 UI recipients are not always full-time unemployed, i.e.
they may have lost only part of their working hours and still work for the remaining hours.
Therefore, the relevant events are the start of the period of collecting UI benets and the end of
this period. However, we simply refer to this period of collecting UI benets as unemployment
and to UI recipients as unemployed workers.
21is eligible for collecting UI benets. This latter variable is the original weekly
working hours reduction divided by 8 (the number of working hours per day).
Finally, we observe if the local UI agency imposed a sanction on the UI recipient.
We do not have any information on the reason why the sanction was imposed or
the size and the duration of the benet reduction. In the database, the percentage
of individuals who got a sanction imposed was less than 3%, among those who
received C&M as well as among those who did not receive C&M.
Table 1 provides some statistics of the data set. Of the UI recipients who
received C&M 52% exit to work before February 8, 1999, while 47% of the con-
trol group found a job. Since some of the individuals were \exposed to the risk"
of nding work since the end of August 1998, while others entered only in the
beginning of December 1998, it is dicult to draw conclusions from this number.
Nevertheless, we can get a rst impression by comparing such probabilities for
dierent groups. In most cases, individuals with a particular characteristic are
more likely to nd work if they receive C&M. Furthermore, males, unemployed
workers who collected UI benets before and single living individuals have higher
exit probabilities than their counterparts, although the dierences are small. In-
dividuals who exit to work are on average younger, receive higher benets per day
and receive these benets for more days per week. But again the dierence are
small. There does not seem to be much dierence in exit probabilities between
individuals living in City 1 and in City 2.
To check the randomization of treatment assignment we estimate a probit
model for being assigned to the treatment or to the control group. As exogenous
variables we use the explanatory (individual) characteristics mentioned above.
Table 2 provides the parameter estimates. Only the dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is single has a signicant eect on the probability of
being in the treatment group. This re
ects an unequal share of the unemployed
individuals in the control group who are living in City 2 and are not single. In
the previous section we mentioned that there might be some problems with the
randomization at the local UI agency in City 2. However, there is no relation
between the individual's household situation and being a Type I or a Type II
unemployed worker (see Appendix 1).
5.2 The data from the follow-up survey
A survey questionnaire was sent by mail to all participants after the experiment
was completed. Because the mailing date was before the nal check on the ad-
ministrative database, more individuals received the questionnaire than there are
22individuals in the latter database (see Section 4). In total 500 individuals received
the questionnaire. The response rate was 33%. From the 394 individuals in the
administrative data, 167 responded (79 in the treatment group and 88 in the
control group). We tried to match the survey respondents to the individuals in
the administrative database. The main advantage of this is that it results in a
larger number of explanatory variables for the analysis of the exit to work. To
match records, we used information on the month of birth, the city of residence,
gender, treatment status, having collected UI benets before, current labor mar-
ket status, and day of starting collecting UI benets. However, due to a large
amount of item nonresponse on these variables, we only succeeded in matching
49 individuals in the treatment group and 55 individuals in the control group.
The survey includes questions on how the unemployed workers evaluate C&M
and on which search channels they have used, in addition to subjective evaluations
of satisfaction with aspects of the benets and re-employment system. The survey
does not include any questions about what occurred after leaving the UI benets
system, for example concerning accepted jobs. We focus on the results based on
the full sample of all survey respondents. The sample that can be matched to the
administrative data invariably gives the same conclusions.10
We start with an examination of how the respondents in the treatment group
characterize C&M. Table 3 provides the numbers of respondents who report that
a given topic or activity had taken place during C&M meetings. The most fre-
quently reported topics and activities are \agreements on the number of job
applications" and \providing information about my UI benets". The other ac-
tivities that are mentioned by at least half of the respondents are \discussing
my labor market history and education" and \checking my job applications". All
these activities are more controlling than advisory. \Suggestions concerning ap-
plications" is only mentioned by one third of the respondents. Clearly, monitoring
is a more important component of C&M than counseling.
A particularly interesting survey variable concerns the use of job search chan-
nels. The individuals were asked to report from a list of possible job search chan-
nels which channels they had actually used during their spell of collecting UI
benets. Table 4 displays how often the dierent channels are used by the UI re-
cipients in the control and the treatment group. The individuals in the treatment
group make more use of all formal job search channels such as public employment
10The survey data also contain self-reported numbers of job applications. However, these
data display an extremely large amount of dispersion. Estimates of count data models for these
data are extremely sensitive with respect to the value at which high numbers are censored or
truncated. Apparently there is a very large amount of measurement error in these data.
23oces, (commercial) employment agencies, the local UI agency and job advertise-
ments in newspapers. Informal job search channels like open application letters
and search through friends and relatives, are more often used by the unemployed
workers who did not receive C&M. In the treatment group around 95% of the
individuals used at least one formal job search channel, while this is 85% in the
control group. On the other hand, almost 80% of the UI recipients in the control
group used at least one informal job search channel against around 55% in the
treatment group. In Subsection 6.5 we provide a formal multivariate analysis of
these variables.
6 Estimation results
6.1 Nonparametric analysis of the duration until exit to
work
We estimate the eect on exit to work with nonparametric and parametric meth-
ods, with duration models and with limited-dependent variable models. Figure
1 presents the nonparametric (Kaplan-Meier) estimates of the survivor functions
until exit to work, in the treatment and control group. Here, as well as below, exit
to non-work destinations is treated as independent right-censoring of the duration
until exit to work. There is hardly any dierence between the two lines during the
rst 14 weeks of unemployment. After that, the survivor function decreases faster
for the individuals in the treatment group, indicating that, in this period, UI re-
cipients who receive C&M have higher re-employment probabilities. However, the
estimates at high durations are only based on a few observations. The gure also
plots the nonparametric condence bands for the survivor function estimates.
Clearly, the survivor function estimates are both within the bands corresponding
to both functions. To investigate further whether the survivor functions dier
across the groups, we perform the nonparametric log-rank test. The test statistic
equals 0.62. Since this test statistic has a standard normal distribution, it implies
that we can not reject the null hypothesis that the survivor functions are the
same.
Figure 2 presents the nonparametric estimates of the hazard rates of the
distribution of the duration until exit to work. Obviously, these are very similar
as well. The estimate for the control group peaks at t = 2 (i.e., after 3 weeks)
whereas the estimate for the treatment group peaks at t = 3 (i.e., after 4 weeks).
This can be explained to some extent by the fact that the rst C&M meeting of
the individuals in the treatment group takes place a few days after registration.
24These individuals may postpone any search activity until after this meeting if they
expect the case workers to provide valuable suggestions. In such a case the search
intensity of the individuals in the treatment group may start o more slowly.
However, note that the dierences between the two estimated hazard rates may
very well re
ect sampling errors, as each curve is based on a sample of about 200
individuals.
6.2 Estimation of duration models for exit to work
Now let us turn to the estimation of duration models. These concern common
reduced-form hazard rate models (see for example Lancaster, 1990).11 Consider
individuals receiving UI benets for t units of time. We assume that dierences
in transition rates from unemployment to work can be characterized by observed
individual characteristics x, an indicator function for being in the treatment group
z, unobserved characteristics v, and the elapsed UI duration itself. We assume v;x
to be constant over time (the data do not allow us to observe changes in x) and
v to be independent of x. In a social experiment, z is by denition independent
of v;x.
The transition rate from UI to work at t conditional on x, z and v is denoted
by (tjx;z;v) and is assumed to have the familiar Mixed Proportional Hazard
(MPH) specication
(tjx;z;v) = (t)exp(x
0 + z + v) (12)
in which (t) represents the individual duration dependence. The proportionate
treatment eect exp() on the exit rate to work for an individual with charac-
teristics x;v at duration t is homogeneous (we also estimate models where  is
allowed to depend on individual characteristics, and models with full interaction
between the treatment eect and the other model determinants; see below).
Let t be the realized duration when leaving to employment. The conditional








Note that although the proportionate treatment eect on the individual exit
rate is homogeneous, the proportionate treatment eect on the individual prob-
11Because we do not have any information on wages, reservation wages and job oers, we can
not econometrically identify the job search model presented in Section 3. See Foug ere, Pradel
and Roger (1998) for a careful structural empirical analysis of a job search model that allows
for dierent search channels.
25ability of exit within a certain time interval is not. The individual probability of









and the ratio of this probability with z = 1 and this probability with z = 0
depends on t;x; and v.
The density function of t conditional on x and z is derived by integration of
the above density over v. From this, it is straightforward to derive the individual
contributions to the likelihood function. The use of a 
ow sample of UI spells
means that all spells are observed from the start, so that we do not have initial
condition problems. The right-censoring in the data is exogenous and is therefore
dealt with in a straightforward manner.
For the duration dependence function and the distribution function of the
unobserved heterogeneity we take 
exible specications. Specically, we take (t)









where j is a subscript for time intervals and Ij(t) are time-varying dummy vari-
ables that are one in consecutive time intervals. Note that with an increasing
number of time intervals any duration dependence pattern can be approximated
arbitrarily closely. We take the distribution function of the unobserved hetero-
geneity to be discrete with unrestricted mass point locations.
The models are estimated with Maximum Likelihood. We take the unit of time
to be one week. The piecewise constant duration dependence is specied in terms
of 4 weeks and we normalize by taking 1 = 0. Initially, we allow the unobserved
heterogeneity distribution to have two points of support. Hence, we estimate the
parameters t (t = 2;:::;5), , v1, v2, p1 and , where  is a vector of 8 parameters
(not including an intercept). Table 5 presents the parameter estimates. We do
not nd any unobserved heterogeneity. During the optimization of the likelihood,
the points of support converge to a single point. The computed standard errors
of all other parameters are conditional on absence of unobserved heterogeneity.
The parameter of interest is , which captures the treatment eect on the exit
rate to work. The estimated value of  is positive but is insignicantly dierent
from 0. Providing C&M to UI recipient raises the individual transition rate to
employment only with approximately 6% (= exp(0:063)   1), suggesting that in
its current setup C&M is not a very useful labor market policy for stimulating
26re-employment. The median of the duration distribution in the data reduces with
about a week.12
The observation period is relatively short. Without any additional assump-
tion, we can only estimate the duration dependence during the rst 20 weeks. In
this period the pattern of duration dependence is hump-shaped. After the rst
duration interval of 4 weeks, we observe a signicant increase and from the second
interval onwards we nd that the hazard rate is slightly decreasing. The duration
dependence signicantly diers from being 
at, i equals 0 for all i = 1;:::;5.
The Likelihood Ratio test statistic on joint signicance is equal to 11.4. Since the
null hypothesis restricts 4 parameters (2;:::;5), we reject it at the 5% signi-
cance level. Obviously, there are some factors like for example stigmatization and
discouragement which aect the re-employment probabilities already in an early
stage of unemployment.
Now let us turn to the covariate eects on the transition rate to employment.
Only the level of the daily UI benets has a signicant eect on individual exit
rates. UI recipients who receive daily benets of around 162 guilders have the
highest re-employment probabilities. This is approximately the median of the
daily benets level of the UI recipients in our dataset and it is just below the
average benets level. According to the job search models in Section 3, a higher
benets level increases the reservation wage, and the re-employment probabilities
decrease. However, the benets level at the early stage of UI depends mainly on
the wage in the job previous to unemployment (see Subsection 2.1). Because
the wage re
ects the productivity of the worker, the benets level most likely
depends on the worker's productivity. Because high productivity workers are
more attractive to employers, these workers have higher exit rates to work. Our
database does not include any other variable which can be used as a measure
of productivity. Therefore, the benets level also picks up some of the eects of
dierences in productivity between workers, which may explain why we do not
nd that the exit rate to work is strictly decreasing in the benets level.
None of the other covariates has any signicant eect. According to a Likeli-
12Based on the estimated duration model, C&M reduces the average (over x) expected dura-
tion with around 25 days, with an estimated standard error of 61 days, while the average (over
x) median duration is reduced with about 15 days (standard error is 36 days). The estimated
duration densities (and therefore the estimated means and medians) are obtained by extrapo-
lation of the estimated hazard rate to durations exceeding the observation period. As a result,
the shapes of the estimated piecewise constant duration dependence specications at high du-
rations strongly aect the estimated dierences of the means and medians. Also, we implicitly
assume that the eect of C&M is constant during the whole spell, even after 6 months when
the treatment period expires.
27hood Ratio test they are also not jointly signicant (the test statistic equals 9.2).
We also estimated models that include in x the squared values of log age and the
number of days receiving UI benets per week. Both these additional variables
hardly aect the optimal value of the loglikelihood function. Although not having
any signicant impact on transition rates from unemployment to employment, we
shortly discuss the covariate eects of the other explanatory variables. Gender
and marital status seem to be the less important covariates in the transition rate
to employment. The other covariates are quantitatively slightly more important.
The re-employment probabilities for the unemployed workers living in City 2 are
smaller than for unemployed workers in City 1, which re
ects the dierences in
local labor market conditions between these cities. As mentioned in Subsection
5.1 the socioeconomic characteristics are slightly better in City 1. The exit rates
to work are higher for younger individuals and UI recipients who collected UI
benets before. This indicates that job search experience is more important than
stigmatization due to having experienced earlier UI spells. The remaining covari-
ate eects relate to the UI benets. Individuals who only receive benets for a
few days per week have a lower transition rate to work. These individuals only
lost a low number of working hours, because either they worked a limited number
of hours or they stayed employed for the remaining hours. In the rst case these
individuals are again most likely searching for part-time jobs as they probably
prefer these over full-time jobs. Either nding a full-time job is easier than nding
a part-time job, or individuals preferring part-time jobs have some unobserved
characteristics which decrease the re-employment probabilities. If the UI recipi-
ents are still employed for the remaining hours, job search is more complicated
and thus again exit rates are lower. 13
Table 6 shows the parameter estimates of separate Mixed Proportional Hazard
rate models for the treatment and control group. This allows for full interaction
between the treatment eect on the one hand, and the covariate eects and
duration dependence on the other. This means that we allow the treatment eect
to be heterogenous: the proportionate eect on the exit rate to work may dier
across individuals with dierent characteristics,14 and the eect may also change
during the spell of unemployment. By analogy to equation (12) we may write
z(tjx;v) = z(t)exp(x0z+v), where the index z denotes the treatment status (1
13We also estimated the duration model on the so-called \matched sample" (see Subsection
5.2). This allows for more elements in x. However, the results are very similar.
14The nonparametric analyses show that the average eect is zero, but the theoretical analyses
suggest that the size of the individual eect depends on the structural parameters, which may
dier across individuals.
28i treated). Then the log proportionate treatment eect (or, simply, the treatment
eect) (t;x) on the exit rate to work for an individual with characteristics x;v
at duration t equals log1(tjx;v)   log0(tjx;v), which equals
(t;x) = log1(t)   log0(t) + x
0(1   0)
In the estimation we allow the unobserved heterogeneity distributions to be
dierent between the groups, although there is no reason to suspect they are
dierent. Invariably, unobserved heterogeneity is estimated to be absent in both
groups, and the reported results are conditional on absence of unobserved het-
erogeneity. We have 12 additional parameters compared to the earlier duration
model. Since the Likelihood Ratio test statistic has a value of 7.7, we accept the
null hypothesis of joint insignicance, which again amounts to insignicance of
the treatment eect. A closer look at the parameter estimates learns that the
estimated models dier slightly in the duration dependence eects and the ef-
fects of being female, age and marital status. The dierences in the age and
duration dependence eects are particularly interesting for the following reason.
Older and longer-term individuals are generally acknowledged to have relatively
bad labor market prospects. Now note that these groups benet somewhat more
from C&M than younger and short-term individuals. This is fully consistent with
the theoretical analysis, which predicts that monitoring has a larger eect if the
individual's labor market prospects are worse.
We also estimated models where the interaction with the treatment eect is
restricted to specic elements in x or to the duration dependence. The results are
in agreement to those presented here. The null hypothesis of a zero treatment
eect is never rejected, not even for specic subgroups or specic time intervals.
6.3 Binary outcome analyses concerning exit to work
Whether an individual has made a transition from unemployment to work or not
before the end of the observation window constitutes a binary outcome measure.
One may dene the corresponding population fraction to be the parameter of
interest. For a range of model specications, a positive treatment eect on the
transition rate to work results in a smaller population fraction among the treated
than among the untreated.
Of course, the probability to make such a transition is lower for individuals
who have entered unemployment just before the end of that period. However, due
to the randomization, the moment of entry into unemployment is independent
of the treatment status. Within both groups we have an identical distribution of
29entry dates across individuals. A more serious problem is posed by individuals
who make a transition to another state (like non-participation) before the end
of the observation window, i.e. who have durations until exit to work that are
right-censored due to exit to other destinations. In general it does not make sense
to allocate these individuals to the group that made the transition to work, or
to the group that has not made that transition, or to drop them completely
from the analysis. This is a disadvantage of using a binary approach in case of
duration data.15 Here we deal with this problem by performing tests under various
assumptions concerning such individuals.
Within each of the two groups, the number of individuals who make a tran-
sition from unemployment to work follows a binomial distribution. We test for
equality of the parameters of this distribution by using the familiar asymptotic
chi-square test (see e.g. Mood, Graybill and Boes, 1986). The test statistic has
the value 1.04, which is smaller than the corresponding 95% critical value of 3.84
of the chi-square(1) distribution. In case we add the individuals who make a tran-
sition to non-work to the individuals who make a transition to work, then the
test statistic value equals 1.05. In sum, these tests accept the null hypothesis that
the treatment is ineective. The same conclusion follows from probit analyses on
whether an individual has made a transition from unemployment to work before
the end of the observation window, correcting for x variables.
We also estimate probit models for whether or not an exit to work is observed
within some xed period after the beginning of the spell. This approach can
be thought of as being in between the duration analysis and the above binary
outcome analysis. However, this approach also focuses on a binary outcome, and,
as before, it is dicult to reconcile with short right-censored spells. Here, we
deal with this by simply excluding spells that are right-censored within the xed
period. For a xed period of 12 weeks the parameter estimates are presented in
Table 7. We exclude 24 observations due to early right-censoring. The parameter
estimates turn out to be insensitive to decreases in the length of the xed period.
However, beyond 12 weeks the number of \early" right-censored spells increases
quickly with the length of the xed period. In any case, the estimated eect of
C&M is invariably positive and insignicant. The estimated covariate eects do
not dier much from those presented in the previous subsection.
15Another disadvantage is that a lot of information is not exploited. The advantage is that
no model specication is needed.
306.4 Cost-benets analysis of the policy
We now estimate the net return of the policy. As noted in Subsection 2.2, the UI
agency receives a lump sum payment at the beginning of the individual's unem-
ployment spell, as a refund for the costs of C&M. The amount of this payment is
supposed to cover the expected expenses of C&M, so it can be regarded as a part
of the average costs of the C&M policy, where the mean benets payments to
C&M recipients constitute the remaining part of the average costs of this policy.
The average costs of a system without C&M then consist of (i) the mean ben-
ets payments to individuals who do not receive C&M and (ii) the expectation
of the costs that the agency has to make every 4 weeks to determine whether
the individual is still eligible for UI benets (recall that with C&M this check is
carried out during the C&M meeting).16 Obviously, to calculate the net expected
return of the policy, we need an estimate of the mean unemployment duration,
which in turn requires the estimation of the duration distribution. To proceed,
we may assume that (i) there is no duration dependence after four months, (ii)
the eect of C&M is constant during the spell of unemployment (including the
period after 6 months, after the nal C&M meeting) and (iii) the benets level
remains constant during unemployment. Under these strong \extrapolation" as-
sumptions, the net expected return, averaged over all individuals in the in
ow,
is estimated to equal 1990 guilders (with a standard error, computed using the
delta method, of 5124 guilders).17
However, the extrapolation assumptions are arbitrary and they have a large
eect on the outcome. For example, if we replace the second assumption by
the assumption that there is no treatment eect after 6 months, then the net
expected return is estimated to equal 124 guilders (standard error 633 guilders).
We therefore adopt an alternative approach, where we estimate the net expected
return in some given duration interval (0;T), as a function of T. If T is smaller
than the length of the observation period, we do not have to make extrapolation
assumptions. We compute, for each individual in the data, the net expected return
for each T between 0 and 20 weeks (the observation period).18 Figure 3 depicts the
16We thus neglect some important indirect costs and returns, such as the overhead costs of
the local UI agency, additional tax payments over post-unemployment earnings, and spillover
eects for example due to displacement of other workers.
17Publication of the values of the determinants of these numbers is prohibited.
18Let ca and b denote the lump sum payment at the beginning of the spell and the bene-
ts level, respectively. At durations 1;2;::: the agency determines at a cost cb whether the
individual is still eligible for UI benets. Further, let f1 and f0 denote the duration densities
within the treatment and control populations, respectively, and let Fi denote the corresponding
distribution functions. The net expected return until T equals
31minus net expected return in (0;T) as a function of T in the observation period.
The scale of the vertical axis is chosen with an eye on the fact that the mean value
of the benets level b among the in
ow into UI is about 3700 guilders per month.
(Note that the cost of provision of C&M is relatively low in comparison to this.)
For T exceeding 19 weeks and 4 days, the net expected return is positive. Because
UI recipients are entitled to benets for at least 6 months, and the UI agency
provides C&M for a period of 6 months, C&M can be considered as cost eective.
Note that most individuals are entitled for more than 6 months of UI benets,
and the eect of C&M does not have to disappear completely after 6 months (for
example, recall that C&M also includes advice on writing application letters).
From a cost-benet point of view, C&M can be considered as rather successful.
However, the condence interval becomes large when T increases up to 6 months
(see Figure 3), and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the net expected return
is zero.
6.5 Search methods
In this subsection we present a formal analysis of the data from the follow-up
survey on the job search channels used by the individuals. We perform analyses
both for the full sample of respondents and for the matched sample, but we only
report those for the full sample, because of the small size of the other sample
(there are no important dierences in the results).
We distinguish between formal and informal job search channels and estimate
a bivariate ordered probit model for the number of formal and informal job search
channels used. Let y
1 and y




0i + "i i = 1;2
The observed variable yi indicating the number of methods used along channel i
is then assumed to satisfy yi = k i ak 1 < y
i  ak, for k = 1;2;:::;k, where
a0 =  1 and ak = 1. Finally, we let "1 and "2 both be standard normally
distributed with correlation . Note that the means and variances of a general
bivariate normal distribution would be unidentied. The 3 formal job search chan-








where I(i < T) = 1 if i < T and is 0 otherwise.
32agency, (2) commercial employment agencies and (3) personnel advertisements.
We distinguish between 2 informal job search channels: (1) open application let-
ters and (2) job search through friends and relatives.
In Table 8 we present the estimation results. Clearly, C&M stimulates the use
of formal search methods at the expense of informal methods. So unemployed
workers who receive C&M substitute eort along the informal channel into eort
along the formal channel. This is in agreement to the theoretical analysis in
Subsection 3.3.19 Note that, as in the empirical literature, older individuals use
more formal channels than younger individuals.
The theoretical results also predict that eort substitution is strongest for the
individuals with the best labor market opportunities. We empirically investigate
this by allowing the C&M eects in the above model to depend on the log age
of the respondent.20 The estimation results (not reported here) show that the
the positive C&M eect on the number of formal channels is weaker for older
individuals, and that the negative C&M eect on the number of informal chan-
nels is also weaker for them. Thus, older individuals use more formal channels
anyway, and they do not substitute as much towards formal channels as younger
individuals do. This is completely in agreement with our theoretical predictions.
7 An integrated view
In this section we combine the empirical evidence based on the administrative
data and the survey data of the social experiment with the theoretical insights
that we obtained and the results in the empirical literature on active labor market
policies, in order to enhance our understanding of the economic behavior of the
unemployed individuals. This enables us to extrapolate our empirical results and
to draw conclusions about a wider class of labor market policies that concern job
search assistance and monitoring of search eort.
In the theoretical analysis, job search assistance is represented by an increase
19Keeley and Robins (1985) use non-experimental data on actual choices of search channels
by respondents to a multi-purpose survey. The data contain indicators of the amount of mon-
itoring and channel use across respondents. Their results do not agree to a high degree to the
theoretical predictions, but obviously their estimates may be strongly aected by self-selection
bias concerning the amount of monitoring and the search channel choice.
20Alternatively, one could interact the C&M eects with the estimated systematic component
exp(x0) of the exit rate to work, since the latter is an indicator of labor market prospects.
However, this requires the use of the \matched" sample, which is substantially smaller than
the survey sample. Moreover, the most signicant estimate in  corresponds to the UI benets
level, and it is not obvious that (the eect of) this level captures labor market opportunities.
33of the eectiveness of search. The theoretical analysis demonstrates that such an
increase leads to an increase of the exit rate to work. The empirical analysis shows
that this rate does not depend on whether individuals are subject to the C&M
policy. Therefore, the \counseling" component in this policy does not entail an
increase in the eectiveness of search. This is conrmed by the survey evidence,
which shows that C&M does not entail any substantial job search assistance.
According to the theoretical analysis, monitoring of search activities leads
to substitution from informal search methods to formal methods. The empirical
analysis of the survey data shows that this is exactly what is taking place. The
theoretical analysis shows that the sign of the net eect on the exit rate to work
is indeterminate. The data tell us that the net eect is zero. We conclude that the
\monitoring" component in the C&M policy is inecient: the resulting individual
behavior is sub-optimal from the individual's point of view, while the exit rate
to work does not change.
The previous paragraphs examine counseling and monitoring in isolation from
each other. If we examine them jointly then we are led to the same conclusions,
although we cannot rule out that counseling leads to a small increase in the exit
rate while monitoring leads to an equally small decrease.
Now let us relate this to some results in the empirical literature that uses
data from social experiments. First, note that we consider unemployed workers
with relatively good labor market prospects, and that the general labor market
conditions at the time the data were collected were very favorable by Dutch
standards. According to our theoretical results and the empirical literature on
search channels, the informal channel is more important if labor market prospects
are good. In that case, channel substitution is relatively easy, and, as a result,
monitoring is ineective. Our empirical results on the interaction eect of age
and treatment status on the choice of search channels also conrm this.
Ashenfelter, Ashmore and Desch^ enes (1999) analyze the eect of a system
with more intensive monitoring on labor market outcomes of U.S. UI recipients.
They nd no signicant eect on the exit rate to employment (they also focus on
other outcome measures, like UI payments and wages). As the U.S. labor market
is characterized by lower unemployment durations than the Dutch labor market
in general, their result is in agreement to our results.
Gorter and Kalb (1996) consider a policy which can be interpreted as com-
ing on top of the C&M policy we consider; in their case the treatment consists
of longer monthly meetings, with more time for job search assistance, and more
monitoring. Their data are from The Netherlands in 1989{1990, and their sam-
ple of UI recipients includes individuals with Type II{IV proling outcomes. As
34a result, the average labor market prospects among their sampled individuals
are worse than in our case. Their estimated eect on the exit rate to work is
twice as large as in our case and almost signicant. The dierence in magnitude
can be explained by two factors. First, their policy entails more substantial job
search assistance. Secondly, individuals with worse characteristics, under worse
macro-economic conditions, may have less scope for substitution of search meth-
ods. In particular, their informal channel may dry up relatively quickly after
in
ow into unemployment, meaning that the cost of search along the informal
channel becomes prohibitively large after a short elapsed duration (Gorter and
Kalb, 1996, do not consider the use of dierent channels in their analysis.) In-
terestingly, Gorter and Kalb (1996) also nd that, at the same time, the rate of
job applications is signicantly larger among the treated. This is in agreement
with both above-mentioned factors. However, remember that the exit rate is not
signicantly larger. This may mean that a disproportionally large amount of the
additional applications result in rejection by the employer. In addition, it should
be noted that data on numbers of applications are sometimes unreliable (recall
the discussion in Subsection 5.2).
Dolton and O'Neill (1995, 1996) also consider job search assistance in com-
bination with increased monitoring, of individuals with on average worse char-
acteristics than we have, in a situation with worse macro-economic conditions
(see also White and Lakey, 1992). Specically, they consider individuals with an
elapsed duration of at least 6 months, in the U.K. in the early 1990s.21 They
nd a positive eect on the exit rate to work and on the job oer arrival rate,
but a zero eect on the reservation wage (they do not distinguish between dif-
ferent search channels). According to our theoretical analysis, this can only be
explained by a positive eect of the job search assistance on the job oer arrival
rate (which leads to a higher reservation wage) in combination with an eect of
the monitoring on the arrival rate (which leads to a lower reservation wage).22
This reinforces the conclusions drawn above from Gorter and Kalb (1996).
Meyer (1995) provides a survey of U.S. social experiments concerning job
search assistance programs. These programs include job search workshops of sev-
21This \Restart" program consists of six-monthly compulsory meetings during which advice
on job search is provided and unemployed workers are placed in contact with employers and
training agencies. The rst meeting takes place after 6 months. Unemployment benets are
reduced or suspended if individuals do not participate in the program or do not search for jobs
suciently hard.
22If job search assistance would have a zero eect on the arrival rate while the exit rate
changes then the reservation wage should decrease. If monitoring would have a zero eect on
the arrival rate while the exit rate increases then the reservation wage should increase.
35eral hours or even days. It turns out that the eect on the exit rate to work
increases in the intensity of the assistance. The decrease in the duration of UI
dependence ranges from around half a week to more than three weeks. The sur-
veys of Bj orklund and Regn er (1996), Fay (1996), and Heckman, LaLonde and
Smith (1999) also report positive eects of intensive job search assistance on the
exit rate to work.
We conclude that the more intensive the job search assistance, the higher the
exit rate to work.23 Also, the worse the labor market prospects (individual or
macro-economic), the larger the eect of monitoring on the exit rate to work.
8 Conclusions
Low-intensity job search assistance programs, like the counseling component of
the C&M policy studied in the present paper, are useless. High-intensity job
search assistance programs have a positive eect on the exit rate to work. Monitor-
ing of relatively well qualied individuals in favorable macroeconomic conditions
is inecient and merely leads to substitution of search methods. Individuals with
worse prospects have less scope for substitution, and monitoring of their search
activity may lead to an increase in the exit rate to work. We conclude that (1) the
more intensive the job search assistance, the higher the exit rate to work, and (2)
the worse the labor market prospects (individual or macro-economic), the larger
the eect of monitoring on the exit rate to work.
In OECD countries, monitoring of unemployment benets recipients has be-
come an increasingly important policy tool (see OECD, 2000, for a survey). Often,
eligibility criteria are harsher, and monitoring is more intense, if the individual
has relatively favorable labor market opportunities (see also Abbring, Van den
Berg and Van Ours, 1997, and Van den Berg, Van der Klaauw and Van Ours,
1998, and references therein). The results in the present paper show that it makes
more sense to focus monitoring on individuals with worse opportunities.
Finally, as a methodological conclusion, the results from the dierent studies
based on social experiments are mutually consistent to a very high degree. This
compares favorably to the literature in which reduced-form models are estimated
from non-experimental data (see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999 for a sur-
vey). In addition, the results from the experiments can be understood well from
23Foug ere, Pradel and Roger (1998) demonstrate in a structural empirical analysis that a
public employment agency that matches employers and employees reduces search costs and
increases the job oer arrival rate. The unemployment durations of the individuals in their
data are relatively large. So their evidence is consistent to ours.
36a theoretical point of view.
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40Appendix
Appendix 1 Proling / classication of unemployed work-
ers
Upon the moment of application for benets, an individual is classied into one
of four \types".24 The classication is used to tune the services of the unemploy-
ment agency to the needs of the worker, with the main purpose to decrease the
expected duration of benets payment. The type may change during the spell of
unemployment.
The classication of an individual is supposed to capture his \distance to the
labor market", which in turn is supposed to be related to his expected duration of
unemployment. The unemployed workers who are considered to have the highest
re-employment probabilities are classied as Type I individuals, while the Type
IV individuals have the highest expected unemployment durations. As mentioned
in the main text, Type I individuals are expected to have sucient skills to nd
work. The Type II and III individuals are considered not to have the skills to
nd work without any assistance. Therefore, these are provided with training and
schooling. The Type IV individuals are the most disadvantaged and need more
care. These individuals are often unable to work or not obliged to search for work
(lone parents with dependent children, drug addicts, etc.).
The scheme which is used to determine the type of the worker consists of three
steps. It is important to keep in mind that, ultimately, the classication does not
only depend on objective measures, but also on the (subjective) opinion of the
case worker or ocial of the unemployment agency.
In the rst step it is determined whether or not the individual is actually
unemployed and a member of the labor force. A worker is a member of the labor
force if he is (i) legally allowed to stay in The Netherlands, (ii) between 16 and
65 years old, and (iii) not disabled. Furthermore, in this step some unemployed
workers who do not have a formal obligation to search for work actively, are
classied as Type IV. This are individuals who meet one of the following criteria:
(i) being older than 57.5 years, (ii) having a dependent child under 5 years old,
(iii) being unemployed due to weather conditions, and (iv) working less due to
a reduction of the hours within the full-time working week.
24This classication is not restricted to unemployed individuals receiving UI benets. Ev-
eryone who registers is classied into the same four types, including those who claim welfare
benets, and even employed workers who register because their contract expires in the near
future, they work part-time and look for a full-time job, or they are just looking for another
job.
41The second step determines a score for the unemployed worker. This score
is based on three items and is expected to be a measure of the individual labor
market prospects. For each of the three items, which we discuss below, the un-
employed workers get a score of 1, 4, 6 or 8 points. The rst item on which the
unemployed workers are evaluated is their profession. Based on some measure
of the tightness of the labor market for individuals with the same profession,
the score on the rst item is determined. In this measure also the age of the
unemployed worker and the geographical region in which he lives are taken into
account. More points are given for better labor market prospects. In case an un-
employed worker has more than one profession, the profession with the highest
score is used.
The second item concerns eduction and work experience. We distinguish three
groups of unemployed workers, low-skilled job losers, high-skilled job losers and
school leavers.25 School leavers are individuals who entered unemployment im-
mediately after full-time education. The number of points they get depends on
their highest completed education. School leavers who dropped out of high school
before completing the education get 6 point if they are capable of performing low-
qualied work, otherwise they only get 1 point. School leavers who did not drop
out early get 8 points if they completed an additional education after high school,
6 point for completing a high school education of 5 or 6 years and 4 point for
nishing a 4-year high school education. The low-skilled job losers get 4 points
if they did not work in the past 3 years, 6 point if they have some work experi-
ence in the past 3 years, but not in the last years and they get 8 points if there
work experience is recent. The points for the high-skilled workers with a relevant
education or more than 3 years of work experienced are distributed in the same
way. Finally, high-skilled workers with less than 3 years of work experience and
without a relevant education get 6 points if their work experience is recent, 4
points if they have worked in the past 3 years, but not in the past years and in
any other case they get only 1 point.
The third item concerns some other characteristics of the unemployed worker.
The employee of the unemployment agency has to judge the individual on job
search behavior, 
exibility, language skills, presentation skills and responsibility.
He has to decide on how the unemployed workers scores on the combination of
these skills and gives 8, 6, 4 or 1 points accordingly.
In the third step it is checked if there are any serious impediments to work
25Here, high and low-skilled does not depend on the level of education, but on the type of work
these unemployed workers have performed. In general, an unemployed worker who performed
high-skilled work is also expected to search for high-skilled work regardless of his education.
42for the unemployed worker. These impediments can be psychological, physical or
social. A common occurring reason of impediments is drug or alcohol addiction,
but also taking care of sick family members can be a possible reason. The un-
employed workers who have such impediments are classied as Type IV. If there
are no impediments, the classication is based on the number of points scored in
step two. The individuals who score 18 points or more are the Type I unemployed
workers. Unemployed workers who score less than 18 points have to show up for
a next meeting. During this meeting it is decided more informally whether the
unemployed worker is of Type II or Type III.
Appendix 2 Proof of Proposition 1
To derive d=d1 we only need to consider the equations (7) and (8). Since we
are only interested in the sign of d=d1, we may normalize c0 = 1 without loss
of generality. Dene a new parameter e  as follows,






After substituting F := F1 = F2;c0 = 1, and the above e  into the equations (7)
and (8), we obtain














It is readily veried that these are equations for the reservation wage and the
exit rate out of unemployment in a model with a single search channel (with
arrival rate e s and search cost function equal to (1=12)1=3s2). The derivative of
 with respect to 1 has the same sign as the derivative of  with respect to the
parameter e  dened above. So, the assumption that F1 = F2 allows us to simplify
the model by reformulating it as a model with a single channel. We can simplify
this further by dening  := (3=2)1=3(e )2 and examining d=d.















43where f is the density of F. Recall that 0 < F() < 1. Equation (13) states that
22 = (Q())2=(   b). By substituting this into the the above expression we
obtain that d=d > 0 if and only if
Q()F()
   b
> f()Q()   (F())
2
As  > b, sucient for this is that
Q()F()

> f()Q()   (F())
2 (15)
Now dene
(x) = E(wjw > x)











(()   )   1




< 1 at x = :
As is shown in Van den Berg (1994), Condition A implies that this inequality is
satised for all x in the support of F. This completes the result for d=d1 > 0.
To show that ds1=d1 > 0 we need to use the original model equations in
the main text. This result then follows from straightforward dierentiation and













Age (in years) 36
(8.4)
# days per week collecting UI 4.3
(0.92)
UI benets per day (in Guilders) 169
(65)
Number of observations 394




log Age  0:094 (0:30)
Collected UI before  0:19 (0:15)
Not single  0:29 (0:14)
# days per week UI  0:028 (0:10)
log Benets per day 0:096 (0:23)
City 2 0:055 (0:14)
Log likelihood -269.23
# observations 394
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 2: Estimation results of the probit model for being assigned to the treatment
group (1) or to the control group (0).
Agreements on the number of job applications 64
Providing information about my UI benets 61
Discussing my labor market history and education 52
Checking my job applications 50
Discussing labor market prospects 46
Suggestions concerning applications 33
Written conrmation of agreements 24
Oering training and schooling 10
Other topics 1
Number of respondents 78
Table 3: Number of respondents in the treatment group who claim that a certain
activity is part of the C&M meetings.
46Treatment Control
group group
Formal job search channels
Public employment oce 17 9
Commercial employment agencies 22 18
Local UI agency 3 0
Job advertisements 28 35
Total 42 40
Informal search channels
Open application letters 21 28
Friends and relatives 10 19
Total 23 38
Number of respondents 44 48
Explanatory note: Total is the total number of respondents who used at least one
of the job search channels (formal or informal) listed above it.
Table 4: Job search channels used in the treatment and control group.













log Age  0:56 (0:36)
Collected UI before 0:25 (0:17)
Not single  0:011 (0:16)
Number of days per week UI 0:19 (0:14)
log Benets per day 9:56 (4:85)
log Benets per day (squared)  0:94 (0:48)
City 2  0:20 (0:16)
Log likelihood -792.17
Number of observations 394
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 5: Estimation results for the basic duration model.
48Exit rate to work Exit rate to work
in treatment group in control group
Intercept
v  22:7 (15:5)  34:8 (21:2)
Duration dependence
1 0 0
2 0:59 (0:26) 0:43 (0:27)
3 0:42 (0:30)  0:0093 (0:33)
4 0:24 (0:34)  0:041 (0:37)
5  0:27 (0:49)  0:50 (0:68)
Individual characteristics
Female  0:22 (0:25) 0:14 (0:24)
log Age  0:30 (0:51)  0:72 (0:52)
Collected UI before 0:34 (0:23) 0:14 (0:25)
Not single  0:25 (0:23) 0:22 (0:24)
Number of days per week UI 0:15 (0:18) 0:19 (0:24)
log Benets per day 8:14 (6:05) 12:7 (8:34)
log Benets per day (squared)  0:82 (0:60)  1:22 (0:81)
City 2  0:33 (0:23)  0:11 (0:24)
Log likelihood -428.96 -359.35
Number of observations 205 189
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 6: Heterogeneous treatment eects: estimation results for separate duration







log Age  0:51 (0:33)
Collected UI before 0:26 (0:16)
Not single 0:015 (0:15)
Number of days per week UI 0:036 (0:12)
log Benets per day 7:75 (3:95)
log Benets per day (squared)  0:76 (0:39)
City 2  0:23 (0:15)
Log likelihood -242.40
Number of observations 370
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses. Individuals with an unemploy-
ment spell that is right-censored within 12 weeks are excluded.
Table 7: Estimation results for probit model for exit to work within 12 weeks.
50Formal Informal
job search job search
Treatment eect
 0:34 (0:29)  0:64 (0:28)
Individual characteristics
Female  0:25 (0:29)  0:21 (0:29)
log Age 0:41 (0:53) 0:026 (0:68)
Collected UI before  0:036 (0:27)  0:25 (0:29)




a1 0:23 (1:97)  1:01 (2:48)
a2 1:65 (2:00) 0:59 (2:48)
a3 2:90 (2:01)
Log likelihood -178.02
Number of observations 87
Explanatory note: Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 8: Estimation results for the bivariate ordered probit model for the number
of formal and informal job search channels.
51Figure 1: Kaplan-Meier estimates of the survivor function to work for individuals
in the treatment and control group.
Figure 2: Nonparametric estimates of the exit rate to work for individuals in the
treatment and control group.
52Figure 3: The net expected return in a time interval until a given unemployment
duration. The dashed lines represent the pointwise condence interval.
53